Trollspace 2

[DECKARD COCAIN]

Perussuomalaisten kielipoliittisen ohjelma tavoittelee virallista asemaa karjalan kielelle sen kotiseutualueilla. Kielen siirtymistä uudelle sukupolvelle tulee tukea koko maassa, kansanedustaja Juho Eerola toteaa.

Puhutaanko tässä nyt sitten Suomesta vai Venäjästä?

[No wave Mymmeli]

Orpon hallituksen ohjelmassa oli vähemmistökielien kannalta joku maininta, mut ilman resursseja noit kielielvytyksiä ei tehdä

[Testo Torture]

Orpon hallituksen ohjelmassa oli vähemmistökielien kannalta joku maininta, mut ilman resursseja noit kielielvytyksiä ei tehdä

Oon yhtä duunipuuhastelua varten lukenut ton koko ohjelman, ja voin kertoo, että siellä on kyllä vähän kaikenlaista muutaki hauskaa

[Trollface-mies]

En tukehtunut oksennukseeni ja tämä kurssi alkaa Turun yliopistolla 3.9. eli parin viikom päästä

Sikäli jos en ole syksyyn mennessä tukehtunut oksennukseeni, niin sain just käteistä tämmötteelle luentosarjalle Turun yliopistolla ens syksynä.

Title: “The Great Patriotic War, 1941–2022” – Memory, Culture, Narratives and Exploitation of the War against the Third Reich in the Soviet Union and Present-Day Russia

Spoiler:

Content: The lecture series focuses on the representations and narratives of the “Great Patriotic War” of the Soviet Union against the Nazi Germany. The primary emphasis in on cultural history of warfare, both in the political construction of wartime narratives and the cultural resonance of wartime narratives in subsequent politics in the USSR and the present-day Russia. The lecture series covers the construction of war propaganda and wartime narratives in 1941–1945, their significance in the Soviet era and their exploitation in the memory politics by the Putin regime, especially in the present-day invasion of Ukraine, where old images and narratives have been deliberately revived.

The lecture series aims to illustrate to the students such matters as the role of the Great Patriotic War as the cornerstone of Soviet patriotism comparable to the Revolution and as the paramount cornerstone of subsequent post-Soviet Russian patriotism; intersections between Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism and their resonance to this day; importance of war propaganda and demonization of the enemy to the culture of war; significance of gender in the construction of wartime heroic myths and images; and the impact of the memory of war on the fault lines between loyalists and dissidents and its ability to transcend these fault lines.

Learning outcomes: Participants will gain a broad understanding of how the culture of war can be constructed, appropriated and utilized as a tool for political goals, and how it can be revived as the opportunity presents itself. They will be able to analyze and understand the far-reaching impact of war on Soviet and present-day Russian society and culture, particularly the role of the memory of war in the construction of identity in the 20th century Soviet Union and the 21st century Russia.

Course outline:

1. War of the Soviet Peoples, or War for Mother Russia? The lecture covers the Soviet rebirth of “patriotism” with the Nazi invasion in 1941, the invocation of Russian national greatness and the appropriation of Russian messianism into the Soviet patriotic rhetoric. The lecture discusses the Soviet attempt to combine the national narrative with the party narrative, i.e. presenting the struggle against foreign invader as a continuity in the Russian national history, while also appealing to the supposed solidarity between the Soviet fraternal peoples in the universal struggle against fascism. The lecture further covers the contrast between the deliberate wartime creation of special national-patriotic narratives for some non-Russian nationalities, and the post-war propagandistic portrayal of other such nationalities, such as Crimean Tatars and Chechens, as traitors and collaborators. The post-1991 transformation of Soviet narratives into new Russian narratives and the attempts by Putin and Medvedev to impose neo-patriotic victory narratives on Belarus and Ukraine are discussed.

2. Images of the Enemy. The lecture approaches the construction of foreign enemy in the Soviet propaganda and its legacy. The lecture portrays the role of state-run Sovinformburo in the centralized organization of wartime propaganda, and the birth of the images of “fascist beast” and “blonde witch” in the subsequent rhetoric of Ilya Ehrenburg and other Soviet propagandists. The propaganda narratives covered in the lecture include the incitement of patriotic hatred against the foreign invader, as well as the fostering of the sacred mission of liberating Europe from fascism. The dehumanization of the enemy and its role in the eventual atrocities and war crimes, as well as their subsequent justification or erasure, will be discussed. The lecture compares these past images and narratives of wartime enemy with their contemporary resurrection in the wartime propaganda against Ukraine.

3. Heroes of the Motherland. The lecture discusses the appropriation of the cult of individual heroism by the Marxist-Leninist ideology during the Second World War, and its role in the production of idealized, exemplary figures for Soviet citizens and national collective in total war. The lecture covers the wartime award of the Hero of Soviet Union, the explosive increase in new military awards for individual heroism after 1941, and the collective cult of “Hero Fortresses” and “Hero Cities”. The lecture also approaches the gendered narratives of heroism and the subsequent supposed wartime breaking of gender barriers with the celebration of women soldiers of the Red Army and Red Air Force. The lecture closes with the revival of heroism in the neo-patriotic narratives of the Putin regime, and the new construction of supposed wartime heroism with the “Z” campaigns of the war against Ukraine.

4. Victory of the People, or Victory of the Leader? The lecture discusses the utilization of war and victory in the strengthening of Stalin’s cult of personality, and the evident contradiction while presenting the Great Patriotic War as an effort by the Soviet peoples. The lecture also covers the rivaling cult of leadership subsequently constructed for the Red Army field commanders such as Marshal Zhukov. The significance of either direct or indirect war experience as a necessary element for subsequent Soviet and Russian leaders is discussed. The examples include Khruschev’s and Brezhnev’s attempts to build up their own personal history of wartime accomplishments. These past examples are compared with Putin’s references to his brother’s death during the Siege of Leningrad and his exploitation of the war in Ukraine in the strengthening of his personal dictatorship.

5. Loyalists and Dissidents; Artists and Authors of the Patriotic War. The lecture focuses on the images and narratives of the Great Patriotic War in art, literature, popular culture and historiography during and after the war. The examples include the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Vasili Grossman, Mikhail Arkadyevich Svetlov, Konstantin Simonov, and Vladimir Gelfand. The lecture illustrates the contrast between the propagandistic, idealizing tones and the more down-to-earth portrayals of the true human cost of the war, both of which were written by dissidents and authors favored by the Soviet system. The lecture also discusses the massive post-war Soviet history-writing projects and audiovisual arts, including wartime propaganda films and major post-war cinema and television productions such as “Liberation” and “Seventeen Moments of Spring”.

6. Desacralization and the Return to Victory. The lecture focuses completely on the repeated re-construction of the wartime narrative in the 25 years which followed Gorbachev’s return to power in 1987. The lecture starts from the glasnost, the official call to ”fill the blank pages of history”, the admission of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and their role in the eventual “desacralization” of the Great Patriotic War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet system. The lecture further discusses the uneasy and transitional approach towards the war during the Yeltsin years and the eventual return to the cult of the Patriotic War under Putin’s regime. These include renewed celebrations of the Victory Day in 2005, the subsequent history wars with East European countries, history laws, and their significance in the eventual run-up to yet another “Patriotic” war in 2014 and 2022.

[Ulan Ude]

En tukehtunut oksennukseeni ja tämä kurssi alkaa Turun yliopistolla 3.9. eli parin viikom päästä

Sikäli jos en ole syksyyn mennessä tukehtunut oksennukseeni, niin sain just käteistä tämmötteelle luentosarjalle Turun yliopistolla ens syksynä.

Title: “The Great Patriotic War, 1941–2022” – Memory, Culture, Narratives and Exploitation of the War against the Third Reich in the Soviet Union and Present-Day Russia

Spoiler:

Content: The lecture series focuses on the representations and narratives of the “Great Patriotic War” of the Soviet Union against the Nazi Germany. The primary emphasis in on cultural history of warfare, both in the political construction of wartime narratives and the cultural resonance of wartime narratives in subsequent politics in the USSR and the present-day Russia. The lecture series covers the construction of war propaganda and wartime narratives in 1941–1945, their significance in the Soviet era and their exploitation in the memory politics by the Putin regime, especially in the present-day invasion of Ukraine, where old images and narratives have been deliberately revived.

The lecture series aims to illustrate to the students such matters as the role of the Great Patriotic War as the cornerstone of Soviet patriotism comparable to the Revolution and as the paramount cornerstone of subsequent post-Soviet Russian patriotism; intersections between Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism and their resonance to this day; importance of war propaganda and demonization of the enemy to the culture of war; significance of gender in the construction of wartime heroic myths and images; and the impact of the memory of war on the fault lines between loyalists and dissidents and its ability to transcend these fault lines.

Learning outcomes: Participants will gain a broad understanding of how the culture of war can be constructed, appropriated and utilized as a tool for political goals, and how it can be revived as the opportunity presents itself. They will be able to analyze and understand the far-reaching impact of war on Soviet and present-day Russian society and culture, particularly the role of the memory of war in the construction of identity in the 20th century Soviet Union and the 21st century Russia.

Course outline:

1. War of the Soviet Peoples, or War for Mother Russia? The lecture covers the Soviet rebirth of “patriotism” with the Nazi invasion in 1941, the invocation of Russian national greatness and the appropriation of Russian messianism into the Soviet patriotic rhetoric. The lecture discusses the Soviet attempt to combine the national narrative with the party narrative, i.e. presenting the struggle against foreign invader as a continuity in the Russian national history, while also appealing to the supposed solidarity between the Soviet fraternal peoples in the universal struggle against fascism. The lecture further covers the contrast between the deliberate wartime creation of special national-patriotic narratives for some non-Russian nationalities, and the post-war propagandistic portrayal of other such nationalities, such as Crimean Tatars and Chechens, as traitors and collaborators. The post-1991 transformation of Soviet narratives into new Russian narratives and the attempts by Putin and Medvedev to impose neo-patriotic victory narratives on Belarus and Ukraine are discussed.

2. Images of the Enemy. The lecture approaches the construction of foreign enemy in the Soviet propaganda and its legacy. The lecture portrays the role of state-run Sovinformburo in the centralized organization of wartime propaganda, and the birth of the images of “fascist beast” and “blonde witch” in the subsequent rhetoric of Ilya Ehrenburg and other Soviet propagandists. The propaganda narratives covered in the lecture include the incitement of patriotic hatred against the foreign invader, as well as the fostering of the sacred mission of liberating Europe from fascism. The dehumanization of the enemy and its role in the eventual atrocities and war crimes, as well as their subsequent justification or erasure, will be discussed. The lecture compares these past images and narratives of wartime enemy with their contemporary resurrection in the wartime propaganda against Ukraine.

3. Heroes of the Motherland. The lecture discusses the appropriation of the cult of individual heroism by the Marxist-Leninist ideology during the Second World War, and its role in the production of idealized, exemplary figures for Soviet citizens and national collective in total war. The lecture covers the wartime award of the Hero of Soviet Union, the explosive increase in new military awards for individual heroism after 1941, and the collective cult of “Hero Fortresses” and “Hero Cities”. The lecture also approaches the gendered narratives of heroism and the subsequent supposed wartime breaking of gender barriers with the celebration of women soldiers of the Red Army and Red Air Force. The lecture closes with the revival of heroism in the neo-patriotic narratives of the Putin regime, and the new construction of supposed wartime heroism with the “Z” campaigns of the war against Ukraine.

4. Victory of the People, or Victory of the Leader? The lecture discusses the utilization of war and victory in the strengthening of Stalin’s cult of personality, and the evident contradiction while presenting the Great Patriotic War as an effort by the Soviet peoples. The lecture also covers the rivaling cult of leadership subsequently constructed for the Red Army field commanders such as Marshal Zhukov. The significance of either direct or indirect war experience as a necessary element for subsequent Soviet and Russian leaders is discussed. The examples include Khruschev’s and Brezhnev’s attempts to build up their own personal history of wartime accomplishments. These past examples are compared with Putin’s references to his brother’s death during the Siege of Leningrad and his exploitation of the war in Ukraine in the strengthening of his personal dictatorship.

5. Loyalists and Dissidents; Artists and Authors of the Patriotic War. The lecture focuses on the images and narratives of the Great Patriotic War in art, literature, popular culture and historiography during and after the war. The examples include the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Vasili Grossman, Mikhail Arkadyevich Svetlov, Konstantin Simonov, and Vladimir Gelfand. The lecture illustrates the contrast between the propagandistic, idealizing tones and the more down-to-earth portrayals of the true human cost of the war, both of which were written by dissidents and authors favored by the Soviet system. The lecture also discusses the massive post-war Soviet history-writing projects and audiovisual arts, including wartime propaganda films and major post-war cinema and television productions such as “Liberation” and “Seventeen Moments of Spring”.

6. Desacralization and the Return to Victory. The lecture focuses completely on the repeated re-construction of the wartime narrative in the 25 years which followed Gorbachev’s return to power in 1987. The lecture starts from the glasnost, the official call to ”fill the blank pages of history”, the admission of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and their role in the eventual “desacralization” of the Great Patriotic War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet system. The lecture further discusses the uneasy and transitional approach towards the war during the Yeltsin years and the eventual return to the cult of the Patriotic War under Putin’s regime. These include renewed celebrations of the Victory Day in 2005, the subsequent history wars with East European countries, history laws, and their significance in the eventual run-up to yet another “Patriotic” war in 2014 and 2022.

OMFG

[Trollface-mies]

Perussuomalaisten kielipoliittisen ohjelma tavoittelee virallista asemaa karjalan kielelle sen kotiseutualueilla. Kielen siirtymistä uudelle sukupolvelle tulee tukea koko maassa, kansanedustaja Juho Eerola toteaa.

Puhutaanko tässä nyt sitten Suomesta vai Venäjästä?

Se olis meillä lähinnä Pohjois-Karjalan maakunta ja Kainuu. Suomellehan edelleenkin kuuluu pieni pala Vienan Karjalaa.

[DECKARD COCAIN]

Perussuomalaisten kielipoliittisen ohjelma tavoittelee virallista asemaa karjalan kielelle sen kotiseutualueilla. Kielen siirtymistä uudelle sukupolvelle tulee tukea koko maassa, kansanedustaja Juho Eerola toteaa.

Puhutaanko tässä nyt sitten Suomesta vai Venäjästä?

Se olis meillä lähinnä Pohjois-Karjalan maakunta ja Kainuu. Suomellehan edelleenkin kuuluu pieni pala Vienan Karjalaa.

Okei! En tiennytkään, että tää kotiseutualue on termi, joka ei siis viittaakaan Vienan karjalaan

[Trollface-mies]

Jos jollekulle ei ole tuttu kurssikuvauksessa mainittu Vladimir Gelfand ja hänen sotamuistelmansa niin sallikaa minun esitellä. Oheinen katkelma on Elisabeth Krimmerin teoksesta "German Women's Life Writing and the Holocaust: Complicity and Gender in the Second World War", Cambridge University Press 2018.

Sisältövarotuksia tiedossa. Varoitusten luonne erikseen spoilereissa.

Spoiler:

Tiedossa siis sota-ajan seksuaalista väkivaltaa. Kirjoittaja vieläpä romantisoi sitä.

Spoiler:

Voi oikeasti olla pahaa luettavaa jos tällaisesta muistoja on. Vielä ehtii kääntyä takaisin, seuraavasta aukeaa.

Spoiler:

[Ulan Ude]

Великая Отечественная война on kyl väkevää kauraa. Sen päälle voi rakentaa varmaan vielä parikin imperiumia, tai ainakin yrittää ja die tryin'

[Ulan Ude]

Jos jollekulle ei ole tuttu kurssikuvauksessa mainittu Vladimir Gelfand ja hänen sotamuistelmansa niin sallikaa minun esitellä. Oheinen katkelma on Elisabeth Krimmerin teoksesta "German Women's Life Writing and the Holocaust: Complicity and Gender in the Second World War", Cambridge University Press 2018.

Sisältövarotuksia tiedossa. Varoitusten luonne erikseen spoilereissa.

Spoiler:

Tiedossa siis sota-ajan seksuaalista väkivaltaa. Kirjoittaja vieläpä romantisoi sitä.

Spoiler:

Voi oikeasti olla pahaa luettavaa jos tällaisesta muistoja on. Vielä ehtii kääntyä takaisin, seuraavasta aukeaa.

Spoiler:

Kiinnostaa toi Krimmerin kirja.

[Ulan Ude]

Kohtuullisen harhaiset näkemykset itsestään ja toiminnastaan tuolla r*iskaajaukolla. Rikollisilla usein on

[Ulan Ude]

Jäin kyl miettii tota ja jäätävää on

[Sergio Pissahätä]

Kaikkea oppii tästä topsusta!

Välillä pitää vähän ärsyttää isäntää, että sen terä ei tylsy

[Ulan Ude]

Jäin kyl miettii tota ja jäätävää on

Siis kyllähän sitä kaikkea saa lukea, mutta että tuo Vladimir Gelfand jorkki päätti sitten kirjoittaa noista teoistaan tuollaiset muistelmat on aika melkoista.

[Trollface-mies]

Ekan luennon avausslaidi, ja päätin että se on nyt tää estetiikka jolla mennään