Putin’s Captives
How a Ruinous Imperial War Has Strengthened His Rule at Home
Spoiler:
Is Russia at war? To anyone visiting Moscow or even the provinces this summer, it can sometimes be hard to find much evidence. People are going about their usual lives, and the economy continues to function. There are no shortages of consumer goods; so far, so-called parallel imports—the system by which Russian importers circumvent Western sanctions by using third countries—have worked well. Only inflation has remained stubbornly intractable, with the annualized rate currently hovering above 16 percent. And, at least when they are asked, many citizens do not seem overly disturbed by what is happening on their western border.
According to survey data released by the independent Levada Center in June, Russians do not seem to be seriously concerned about the economic effects of the conflict: half of respondents say sanctions will strengthen the country and stimulate development, and another quarter say sanctions will have no negative effect on growth. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating has stabilized above 80 percent, or about ten points above prewar figures. And when it comes to the war itself, many respondents say they are prepared to tighten their belts and that they are proud of their country and their army. Many also express optimism that conditions for consumers will improve, and that the future for domestic production looks rosy.
It might be tempting to assume that Russians are simply fearful of speaking their minds. But Levada’s findings, which fluctuate significantly from month to month, have generally proven a useful indicator of the broad direction of the public mood. And at present, many Russians seem remarkably sanguine about their collective future, even as the country embarks on a vast imperial project in eastern Ukraine, one that has already led to an unprecedented wave of refugees and left Russia increasingly isolated.
As the war nears the end of its fifth month, the situation in Russia suggests that a shift is beginning to take place—both in the government and in the general population. As Putin has made clear, Russia’s plans in Ukraine will proceed regardless of the economic consequences—and all indications are these will be large. For ordinary Russians, that has meant that the “special operation” is not going to be over anytime soon. Instead, they must embrace a new Russia in which it is essential to behave like a patriot and support Putin’s theatrics and not concern themselves with temporary hardships. In the new Russia, everyone is fine as long as he or she is not forced into the trenches.
GILDED EMPIRE
For those paying attention, it is not hard to find indications of how costly the war has become. On June 12, for example, Izvestia—a once-liberal newspaper long since taken over by the Kremlin—posted a statement on its website on behalf of Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin’s first deputy chief of staff and the Kremlin’s main political puppet master. “All of Russia will work to rebuild a Donbas destroyed by fascists,” the statement said. “Yes, it will cost several trillion rubles. But that money will be allocated from the state budget—even at the price of a temporary drop in the nation’s living standards.” It went on to say that Kiriyenko was “working today on incorporating the new territories into our motherland.”
Of course, no Kremlin official could ever acknowledge anything like this openly, and the statement was quickly taken down; the next day, Izvestia said that its site had been hacked and that the document was fake. As it turned out, it was a fake, devised perhaps by Kiriyenko’s detractors. But everything in the Izvestia report appears to be true: Russia really does intend to keep control of these territories—or, as Putin said on the 350th anniversary of the birth of Peter the Great—to “return and fortify” these imperial lands. And that will certainly come at a great cost, putting enormous strain on the country’s economic resources and manpower.
For now, the Kremlin has left little doubt that the economy takes a distant second to its imperial ambitions. This was confirmed in leaks from Putin’s mid-June meeting with Alexei Kudrin, the head of the Accounts Chamber, a parliamentary-appointed body overseeing the spending of state finances. As Putin’s former finance minister, Kudrin also happens to be the unofficial leader of Russia’s liberals inside the system, and in the meeting, he warned the Russian president that prolonging the “special operation” would have severe economic consequences. Putin would have none of it. The “aims of the operation,” he told Kudrin, would be pursued regardless of the economic damage it might cause.
But Russia will soon be in deep water. To sustain Putin’s vision, the reconstruction of Ukrainian territory seized and destroyed by Russian forces will have to become the mainstay of Kremlin policy. It will require an immense expense in treasure at precisely the time when the consequences of the Western economic blockade of Russia begin to be felt most acutely. Moreover, by next spring, this economic pain will coincide with the start of campaigning for the 2024 presidential election, which Putin will need to win by a decisive vote to retain his iron grip on power.
Already, wealthier regions of Russia, such as Moscow, have been obliged to provide material assistance to Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine—territories that officials now refer to as Russian “forever more.” Russian regional state bodies and the federal ministries are also expected to contribute managerial resources: some managers will be rotated in and out of Russian areas of Ukraine to work, while others will be appointed to permanent positions. Aspiring young technocrats will not be short of opportunities. Schoolteachers are also being sent to the occupied territories to address the local populations’ urgent need for indoctrination in Putinism. Especially important is the official version of Russian history, which already includes recognizing the independence of the two Donbas states. The Kremlin is not, however, promising ordinary citizens any special benefits from this territorial expansion; instead, it is a matter of pure ideology, returning Russia to its purported correct boundaries.
By involving Russians in the imperial project, the Kremlin is intuitively feeling around for a new kind of social contract between the state and the conformist part of Russian society. That contract should work for a while, at least for those who are comfortably removed from the war itself. The meaning of this contract is roughly as follows: the population supports the “special operation” as a campaign to protect Russian sovereignty in exchange for which Putin is not declaring a general military mobilization, only offering contract military service to those who want to fight.





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