Putinin Venäjä

[Kaikki muut ovat menneet]

poistettu

[Rasmus-mafioso]

Beevor kutsui Putinia yhdeksi modernin ajan hämmästyttävimmistä sotilaallisista katastrofeista.

Spoiler:

[Kirvestä ottaan]

Masha Gessenin Putin-elämäkertaa olen selaillut ja siinä käydään hyvin läpi Putinin uraa ennen presidenttiyttä. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_W ... imir_Putin
PBS:n vuonna 2018 tekemää haastattelusarjaa suosittelen myös: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=P ... 6h2kMXGfEE

Nää on kans hyviä:

Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West - Catherine Belton

The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin - Steven Lee Myers

[kuka hemmetti]

Beevor kutsui Putinia yhdeksi modernin ajan hämmästyttävimmistä sotilaallisista katastrofeista.

Spoiler:

Tätä asian tilaahan ruvettiin spekuloimaan piffollla jo pari viikkoa sitten

[eh]

1/2

Timeltä pitkä juttu Ukrainasta, aiheena Venäjän kansan osallisuus tilanteeseen. Aika jäistä vettä tarjoillaan yhteen sun toiseenkin niskaan, mm. uutislähetyksessä kyltin kanssa protestoineelle toimittajalle. Ehkä karuin yksittäinen kohta oli kysymys: montako ukrainankielistä koulua Venäjällä on? Vastaus: ei yhtään, ja kun taannoin joku yritti sellaisen perustaa, hänet tapettiin ja hänen vaimonsa hakattiin teholle.

https://time.com/6160347/ukrainians-bla ... s-for-war/

Ukrainians Don't Blame Just Putin on The War. They Blame Russians.

Laitetaas tää Timen juttu tännekin, koska koskee osin myös Venäjää ja sen tulevaisuutta, vaikka ukrainalaisten näkökulmasta. Tää pätkä erityisesti herätti ajatuksia:

That evening, I had a meeting scheduled with Dmytro Potekhin, a journalist and one of the organizers of the 2004 Orange Revolution, which overturned the corrupt result of that year’s presidential election. If the Russian people were to mobilize, it would likely be in a color revolution like the one Dmytro participated in. He was on the phone with me from Kyiv, and like everyone else I’d spoken to, Dmytro wasn’t optimistic. “Do I think a colored revolution is possible in Russia? Perhaps. Theoretically Russia could be democratic, though historically it hasn’t happened.”

Dmytro explained how, in 2005 and 2006, he’d traveled to Russia and trained their dissidents in the strategies and tactics of non-violent resistance. So why had those dissidents failed in Russia? “The problem is cultural,” he said. “Russian culture expects a single leader. Other societies are flatter. They are not vertical, like Russia. Every time the Russians create a movement it evolves into a vertical organization, one with a boss on the top. Look at Navalny. He could have created a great anti-corruption movement, but instead a vertical organization was built around him. I tried to teach Russians to build decentralized networks, but always they built corporations with a boss on the top and officers in the regions. Once the guy on the top is detained and once the regional offices are raided, the organization is stopped.”

On siellä myös historioitsija, joka ei näe Venäjän tulevaisuutta yhtään sen valoisampana:

“Over five hundred years there have been many attempts to emancipate Russian society. Every attempt collapses with a ruthless autocrat. Why do the Russian people choose unfreedom? The answer is Russian culture. If Russia is indeed the savior of the world, that would mean its suffering has meaning, that its suffering is synonymous with its piety. That’s why the sanctions won’t work. Could you convince a Christian to become godless by making him suffer? No, of course not, his suffering only draws him closer to God. Russia has enjoyed periods of freedom, but always it returns to this condition of suffering. It’s important to understand that it’s not Putin who took Russia, but rather Russia which gave itself to Putin, and Putin has used Russia’s history of suffering to consolidate his power.”

Hrytsak folded his arms. “This city has been Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and Russian. The Poles in particular have a very strong claim on Lviv, but their culture is different than Russia’s. They have the ability to rethink the past, while Russian culture has a tendency to relive the past. In the one case, it’s like driving car with a small rearview mirror you can reference. In the other case, it’s like driving a car with your windshield coated in mud. All you can do is look out the back window.”

The Third World War, according to Hrytsak, had already begun. Russia, like Germany at the end of the First World War, had suffered a humiliating defeat at the end of the Cold War. He used the term “Weimar” to describe Russia’s post-Cold War government in the 1990s. He noted how Putin, like Hitler, mined nuggets of grievance out of a selective, flawed interpretation of history, then refined those grievances into political power, enough power to sell this narrative we were seeing now, one in which Russia would liberate brother Ukrainians from their Nazi government led by a Jewish president. “We don’t like being called brothers,” Hrytsak said, “by people who murder us.”

When I asked Hrytsak what, if anything, could break this spell, he explained, “The Russian people have made a bargain with Putin, and it’s one they’ve made throughout their history. They have allowed a despot to take away their freedom, but in exchange he has offered them glory.”

[Jean D'ork]

1/2

Timeltä pitkä juttu Ukrainasta, aiheena Venäjän kansan osallisuus tilanteeseen. Aika jäistä vettä tarjoillaan yhteen sun toiseenkin niskaan, mm. uutislähetyksessä kyltin kanssa protestoineelle toimittajalle. Ehkä karuin yksittäinen kohta oli kysymys: montako ukrainankielistä koulua Venäjällä on? Vastaus: ei yhtään, ja kun taannoin joku yritti sellaisen perustaa, hänet tapettiin ja hänen vaimonsa hakattiin teholle.

https://time.com/6160347/ukrainians-bla ... s-for-war/

Ukrainians Don't Blame Just Putin on The War. They Blame Russians.

Spoiler:

Laitetaas tää Timen juttu tännekin, koska koskee osin myös Venäjää ja sen tulevaisuutta, vaikka ukrainalaisten näkökulmasta. Tää pätkä erityisesti herätti ajatuksia:

That evening, I had a meeting scheduled with Dmytro Potekhin, a journalist and one of the organizers of the 2004 Orange Revolution, which overturned the corrupt result of that year’s presidential election. If the Russian people were to mobilize, it would likely be in a color revolution like the one Dmytro participated in. He was on the phone with me from Kyiv, and like everyone else I’d spoken to, Dmytro wasn’t optimistic. “Do I think a colored revolution is possible in Russia? Perhaps. Theoretically Russia could be democratic, though historically it hasn’t happened.”

Dmytro explained how, in 2005 and 2006, he’d traveled to Russia and trained their dissidents in the strategies and tactics of non-violent resistance. So why had those dissidents failed in Russia? “The problem is cultural,” he said. “Russian culture expects a single leader. Other societies are flatter. They are not vertical, like Russia. Every time the Russians create a movement it evolves into a vertical organization, one with a boss on the top. Look at Navalny. He could have created a great anti-corruption movement, but instead a vertical organization was built around him. I tried to teach Russians to build decentralized networks, but always they built corporations with a boss on the top and officers in the regions. Once the guy on the top is detained and once the regional offices are raided, the organization is stopped.”

On siellä myös historioitsija, joka ei näe Venäjän tulevaisuutta yhtään sen valoisampana:

“Over five hundred years there have been many attempts to emancipate Russian society. Every attempt collapses with a ruthless autocrat. Why do the Russian people choose unfreedom? The answer is Russian culture. If Russia is indeed the savior of the world, that would mean its suffering has meaning, that its suffering is synonymous with its piety. That’s why the sanctions won’t work. Could you convince a Christian to become godless by making him suffer? No, of course not, his suffering only draws him closer to God. Russia has enjoyed periods of freedom, but always it returns to this condition of suffering. It’s important to understand that it’s not Putin who took Russia, but rather Russia which gave itself to Putin, and Putin has used Russia’s history of suffering to consolidate his power.”

Hrytsak folded his arms. “This city has been Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and Russian. The Poles in particular have a very strong claim on Lviv, but their culture is different than Russia’s. They have the ability to rethink the past, while Russian culture has a tendency to relive the past. In the one case, it’s like driving car with a small rearview mirror you can reference. In the other case, it’s like driving a car with your windshield coated in mud. All you can do is look out the back window.”

The Third World War, according to Hrytsak, had already begun. Russia, like Germany at the end of the First World War, had suffered a humiliating defeat at the end of the Cold War. He used the term “Weimar” to describe Russia’s post-Cold War government in the 1990s. He noted how Putin, like Hitler, mined nuggets of grievance out of a selective, flawed interpretation of history, then refined those grievances into political power, enough power to sell this narrative we were seeing now, one in which Russia would liberate brother Ukrainians from their Nazi government led by a Jewish president. “We don’t like being called brothers,” Hrytsak said, “by people who murder us.”

When I asked Hrytsak what, if anything, could break this spell, he explained, “The Russian people have made a bargain with Putin, and it’s one they’ve made throughout their history. They have allowed a despot to take away their freedom, but in exchange he has offered them glory.”

Voi vittu, taas

[viemärilabyrintti]

Laittakaa noi tekstiseinät spoilerien taakse viimeistään quottaessa.

[Jean D'ork]

Laittakaa noi tekstiseinät spoilerien taakse viimeistään quottaessa.

sho 'nuff

[Lana Ctrl-Alt-Del Rey]

Kiina ilmeisesti just perui puolen miljardin diilin jostain kaasujalostamosta Venäjälle koska pelkäävät pakotteita. Nami nami.

[Ingmar Bergmanin kuolema]

Jutut Putinista jonain vakoojana James Bondin tai oikeammin Max Otto von Stierlitzin tyyliin ovat jälkikäteistä myytinrakentamista. Putin oli isossa kuvassa melko merkityksetön yhteysupseeri Stasin ja KGB:n välillä jälkimmäisen itäsaksalaisessa sivutoimistossa. Ilmeisen pätevä tekijä hommassaan, joka kuitenkin oli pitkälti raporttien pyörittämistä ja viestinvälitystä.

Oma tämänhetkinen suosikkini Putin-myyteistä on hänen salainen 70-luvun seikkailunsa Mosambikissa, jossa hän neuvoi paikallisia kaatamaan kolonialistien vallan:

Spoiler:

And if this picture is true, that President Putin was a comrade of our Great and Heroic leader Samora Machel in 1973? During the dark days of struggle against colonialism and imperialism? Then every African on earth must support President Putin and Russia in this struggle!

Hevonpasketta sanoo BBC, mutta kyllä tuonkin joku nielee maailmankuvaansa tukeakseen.

[zutonFever]

Joku upseeri muistelemassa kärsimystä ja taistelua kolonialismia vastaan, ja heti perään supporttaamassa Venäjää.

[Trollface-mies]

Mosambikissa muistaakseni maalailivat tankkeihin Bob Marleyn kuvia kun surrasivat eteläafrikkalaisia ja Renamoa vastaan, sepä oliskin jos Putin olis istunut reggae-panssarivaunussa.

[Rogenson Crusoe]

Onko akateemikoiden keskuudessa tehty nyt joku yhteinen päätös, että tällaiset essentialistiset selitykset on ihan kosher vai mitä helvettiä?

Kokeillaan korvata tuo "Russian" millä tahansa muulla kansallisuudella tai etnisyydellä, niin nuo edellä linkatut tekstitkään ei hirveästi poikkeaisi Halla-ahon somaliläpistä.

Ja nimenomaan tämä on ongelma silloin, kun puhutaan ihmisistä, ei esimerkiksi poliittisesta kulttuurista.

Edit. Ja tuossa puhuivat ukrainalaiset kyllä, mutta Hesarissakin on ollut tällaisia MITÄ ON VENÄLÄISYYS -tyylisiä tuuttauksia, joissa sitten päädytään jonnekin tuhansien vuosien taakse ja lopuksi todetaan, että mikään ei voi ikinä muuttua.

[38911 BASIC BYTES FREE]

Jahas, Bellingcatin suuri tän päivän paljastus olikin sitten tämmönen:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/03 ... 15-murder/

[Jimi Ketipinor]

Katoin Maksim Katsin haastattelun eilen yhden ukrainalaisen toimittajan kanssa. Kats heitti siinä vastapallon ukrainalaisille, että Ukrainassakin media oli suht riippumatonta Euromaidanin aikoihin, niin koko kansalle välittyi kuva, miten siellä tylytetään mielenosoittajia. Tää sit lisäsi momenttia Ukrainan protesteille.

Venäjällä ei ole hirveemmin riippumatonta (perinteistä) mediaa varsinkaan nyt, niin kuvat mielenosoittajien pidätyksistä ei leviä mihinkään, paitsi netissä, jossa yleisö on jo Putinia vastaan valmiiksi. Mielenosoitukset ei siis pysty nyt keräämään momenttia vaikka oiskin tuhansia kaduilla, sillä valtionmedia pystyy vaientamaan ne kuoliaaksi.

Pistin tuohon spoilereihin haastattelun lähteiden nimessä mut ei oo enkkutekstejä

Spoiler: