Punk in Finland

Karppinen wrote: ↑

27 Mar 2022, 19:32

Masha Gessenin Putin-elämäkertaa olen selaillut ja siinä käydään hyvin läpi Putinin uraa ennen presidenttiyttä. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_W ... imir_Putin
PBS:n vuonna 2018 tekemää haastattelusarjaa suosittelen myös: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=P ... 6h2kMXGfEE

Rasmus-mafioso wrote: ↑

27 Mar 2022, 20:46

Beevor kutsui Putinia yhdeksi modernin ajan hämmästyttävimmistä sotilaallisista katastrofeista.

Spoiler:

Ketokiila wrote: ↑

27 Mar 2022, 19:36

1/2

Timeltä pitkä juttu Ukrainasta, aiheena Venäjän kansan osallisuus tilanteeseen. Aika jäistä vettä tarjoillaan yhteen sun toiseenkin niskaan, mm. uutislähetyksessä kyltin kanssa protestoineelle toimittajalle. Ehkä karuin yksittäinen kohta oli kysymys: montako ukrainankielistä koulua Venäjällä on? Vastaus: ei yhtään, ja kun taannoin joku yritti sellaisen perustaa, hänet tapettiin ja hänen vaimonsa hakattiin teholle.

https://time.com/6160347/ukrainians-bla ... s-for-war/

Ukrainians Don't Blame Just Putin on The War. They Blame Russians.

eh wrote: ↑

25 Mar 2022, 23:41

Laitetaas tää Timen juttu tännekin, koska koskee osin myös Venäjää ja sen tulevaisuutta, vaikka ukrainalaisten näkökulmasta. Tää pätkä erityisesti herätti ajatuksia:

Elliot Ackermann/Time wrote:That evening, I had a meeting scheduled with Dmytro Potekhin, a journalist and one of the organizers of the 2004 Orange Revolution, which overturned the corrupt result of that year’s presidential election. If the Russian people were to mobilize, it would likely be in a color revolution like the one Dmytro participated in. He was on the phone with me from Kyiv, and like everyone else I’d spoken to, Dmytro wasn’t optimistic. “Do I think a colored revolution is possible in Russia? Perhaps. Theoretically Russia could be democratic, though historically it hasn’t happened.”

Dmytro explained how, in 2005 and 2006, he’d traveled to Russia and trained their dissidents in the strategies and tactics of non-violent resistance. So why had those dissidents failed in Russia? “The problem is cultural,” he said. “Russian culture expects a single leader. Other societies are flatter. They are not vertical, like Russia. Every time the Russians create a movement it evolves into a vertical organization, one with a boss on the top. Look at Navalny. He could have created a great anti-corruption movement, but instead a vertical organization was built around him. I tried to teach Russians to build decentralized networks, but always they built corporations with a boss on the top and officers in the regions. Once the guy on the top is detained and once the regional offices are raided, the organization is stopped.”

On siellä myös historioitsija, joka ei näe Venäjän tulevaisuutta yhtään sen valoisampana:

“Over five hundred years there have been many attempts to emancipate Russian society. Every attempt collapses with a ruthless autocrat. Why do the Russian people choose unfreedom? The answer is Russian culture. If Russia is indeed the savior of the world, that would mean its suffering has meaning, that its suffering is synonymous with its piety. That’s why the sanctions won’t work. Could you convince a Christian to become godless by making him suffer? No, of course not, his suffering only draws him closer to God. Russia has enjoyed periods of freedom, but always it returns to this condition of suffering. It’s important to understand that it’s not Putin who took Russia, but rather Russia which gave itself to Putin, and Putin has used Russia’s history of suffering to consolidate his power.”

Hrytsak folded his arms. “This city has been Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and Russian. The Poles in particular have a very strong claim on Lviv, but their culture is different than Russia’s. They have the ability to rethink the past, while Russian culture has a tendency to relive the past. In the one case, it’s like driving car with a small rearview mirror you can reference. In the other case, it’s like driving a car with your windshield coated in mud. All you can do is look out the back window.”

The Third World War, according to Hrytsak, had already begun. Russia, like Germany at the end of the First World War, had suffered a humiliating defeat at the end of the Cold War. He used the term “Weimar” to describe Russia’s post-Cold War government in the 1990s. He noted how Putin, like Hitler, mined nuggets of grievance out of a selective, flawed interpretation of history, then refined those grievances into political power, enough power to sell this narrative we were seeing now, one in which Russia would liberate brother Ukrainians from their Nazi government led by a Jewish president. “We don’t like being called brothers,” Hrytsak said, “by people who murder us.”

When I asked Hrytsak what, if anything, could break this spell, he explained, “The Russian people have made a bargain with Putin, and it’s one they’ve made throughout their history. They have allowed a despot to take away their freedom, but in exchange he has offered them glory.”

eh wrote: ↑

27 Mar 2022, 23:15

Ketokiila wrote: ↑

27 Mar 2022, 19:36

1/2

Timeltä pitkä juttu Ukrainasta, aiheena Venäjän kansan osallisuus tilanteeseen. Aika jäistä vettä tarjoillaan yhteen sun toiseenkin niskaan, mm. uutislähetyksessä kyltin kanssa protestoineelle toimittajalle. Ehkä karuin yksittäinen kohta oli kysymys: montako ukrainankielistä koulua Venäjällä on? Vastaus: ei yhtään, ja kun taannoin joku yritti sellaisen perustaa, hänet tapettiin ja hänen vaimonsa hakattiin teholle.

https://time.com/6160347/ukrainians-bla ... s-for-war/

Ukrainians Don't Blame Just Putin on The War. They Blame Russians.

Spoiler:

eh wrote: ↑

25 Mar 2022, 23:41

Laitetaas tää Timen juttu tännekin, koska koskee osin myös Venäjää ja sen tulevaisuutta, vaikka ukrainalaisten näkökulmasta. Tää pätkä erityisesti herätti ajatuksia:

Elliot Ackermann/Time wrote:That evening, I had a meeting scheduled with Dmytro Potekhin, a journalist and one of the organizers of the 2004 Orange Revolution, which overturned the corrupt result of that year’s presidential election. If the Russian people were to mobilize, it would likely be in a color revolution like the one Dmytro participated in. He was on the phone with me from Kyiv, and like everyone else I’d spoken to, Dmytro wasn’t optimistic. “Do I think a colored revolution is possible in Russia? Perhaps. Theoretically Russia could be democratic, though historically it hasn’t happened.”

Dmytro explained how, in 2005 and 2006, he’d traveled to Russia and trained their dissidents in the strategies and tactics of non-violent resistance. So why had those dissidents failed in Russia? “The problem is cultural,” he said. “Russian culture expects a single leader. Other societies are flatter. They are not vertical, like Russia. Every time the Russians create a movement it evolves into a vertical organization, one with a boss on the top. Look at Navalny. He could have created a great anti-corruption movement, but instead a vertical organization was built around him. I tried to teach Russians to build decentralized networks, but always they built corporations with a boss on the top and officers in the regions. Once the guy on the top is detained and once the regional offices are raided, the organization is stopped.”

On siellä myös historioitsija, joka ei näe Venäjän tulevaisuutta yhtään sen valoisampana:

“Over five hundred years there have been many attempts to emancipate Russian society. Every attempt collapses with a ruthless autocrat. Why do the Russian people choose unfreedom? The answer is Russian culture. If Russia is indeed the savior of the world, that would mean its suffering has meaning, that its suffering is synonymous with its piety. That’s why the sanctions won’t work. Could you convince a Christian to become godless by making him suffer? No, of course not, his suffering only draws him closer to God. Russia has enjoyed periods of freedom, but always it returns to this condition of suffering. It’s important to understand that it’s not Putin who took Russia, but rather Russia which gave itself to Putin, and Putin has used Russia’s history of suffering to consolidate his power.”

Hrytsak folded his arms. “This city has been Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and Russian. The Poles in particular have a very strong claim on Lviv, but their culture is different than Russia’s. They have the ability to rethink the past, while Russian culture has a tendency to relive the past. In the one case, it’s like driving car with a small rearview mirror you can reference. In the other case, it’s like driving a car with your windshield coated in mud. All you can do is look out the back window.”

The Third World War, according to Hrytsak, had already begun. Russia, like Germany at the end of the First World War, had suffered a humiliating defeat at the end of the Cold War. He used the term “Weimar” to describe Russia’s post-Cold War government in the 1990s. He noted how Putin, like Hitler, mined nuggets of grievance out of a selective, flawed interpretation of history, then refined those grievances into political power, enough power to sell this narrative we were seeing now, one in which Russia would liberate brother Ukrainians from their Nazi government led by a Jewish president. “We don’t like being called brothers,” Hrytsak said, “by people who murder us.”

When I asked Hrytsak what, if anything, could break this spell, he explained, “The Russian people have made a bargain with Putin, and it’s one they’ve made throughout their history. They have allowed a despot to take away their freedom, but in exchange he has offered them glory.”

viemärilabyrintti wrote: ↑

27 Mar 2022, 23:58

Laittakaa noi tekstiseinät spoilerien taakse viimeistään quottaessa.