Venäjän hyökkäys Ukrainaan 2022

[Ingmar Bergmanin kuolema]

Tänään on Kiovaan isketty ohjuksilla keskellä päivää viimeöisen hyökkäyksen lisäksi. Jos istahdan strategianojatuoliini ja yritän löytää tästä järkeä, niin ehkä tämän nyt on sitä puhuttua strategiaa, jossa Ukrainan ilmatorjuntaresurssit yritetään kuluttaa loppuun, mutta tosi nopeasti. Viittaisi siihen, että venäläiset valmistelevat viimeisen varsinaisen valttinsa eli ilmavoimien käyttöönottoa. Mitä vähemmän ukrainalaisilla on käytössä ilmatorjuntaa, sitä turvallisempi on venäläishävittäjien lentää panssarikiiloja torjumassa. Iranilaismopot kuitenkin putoavat ammustorjunnalla, ja risteilyohjuksia ei ole määrättömästi, joten luulisi ukrainalaisilla riittävän parempaa materiaalia, jota heitellä päin migejä ja sukhoita, kunhan iso hyökkäys käynnistyy.

[hellästi takaluukkuun pantu koira]

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/p ... on-ukraine

The scale of Russian losses in 2022, combined with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation confronting NATO systems they had not previously contended with, has caused a significant deviation in Russian operations from the country’s doctrine. This report seeks to outline how Russian forces have adapted their tactics in the Ukrainian conflict and the challenges this has created for the Ukrainian military that must be overcome. The report examines Russian military adaptation by combat function.

Russian infantry tactics have shifted from trying to deploy uniform Battalion Tactical Groups as combined arms units of action to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialised and disposable troops. These are formed into task-organised groupings. Line infantry are largely used for ground holding and defensive operations. Disposable infantry are used for continuous skirmishing to either identify Ukrainian firing positions, which are then targeted by specialised infantry, or to find weak points in Ukrainian defences to be prioritised for assault. Casualties are very unevenly distributed across these functions. The foremost weakness across Russian infantry units is low morale, which leads to poor unit cohesion and inter-unit cooperation.

Russian engineering has proven to be one of the stronger branches of the Russian military. Russian engineers have been constructing complex obstacles and field fortifications across the front. This includes concrete reinforced trenches and command bunkers, wire-entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and complex minefields. Russian mine laying is extensive and mixes anti-tank and victim-initiated anti-personnel mines, the latter frequently being laid with multiple initiation mechanisms to complicate breaching. These defences pose a major tactical challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations.

Russian armour is rarely used for attempts at breakthrough. Instead, armour is largely employed in a fire support function to deliver accurate fire against Ukrainian positions. Russia has started to employ thermal camouflage on its vehicles and, using a range of other modifications and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), has significantly reduced the detectability of tanks at stand-off ranges. Furthermore, these measures have reduced the probability of kill of a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at ranges beyond 1,400 m.

Russian artillery has begun to significantly refine the Reconnaissance Strike Complex following the destruction of its ammunition stockpiles and command and control infrastructure by guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS) in July 2022. This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire. The key system enabling this coordination appears to be the Strelets system. There has been a shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects munitions and barrel availability. Responsive Russian fires represent the greatest challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations. Russian artillery is also increasingly relying on loitering munitions for counterbattery fires.

Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Russian air defences have also seen a significant increase in their effectiveness now that they are set up around known, and fairly static, locations and are properly connected. Although Russia has persistently struggled to respond to emerging threats, over time it has adapted. Russian air defences are now assessed by the Ukrainian military to be intercepting a proportion of GMLRS strikes as Russian point defences are directly connected to superior radar.

Russian aviation remains constrained to delivering stand-off effects, ranging from responsive lofted S-8 salvos against Ukrainian forming-up points, to FAB-500 glide bombs delivered from medium altitude to ranges up to 70 km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500s and is systematically upgrading them with glide kits. Although they only have limited accuracy, the size of these munitions poses a serious threat. The Russian Aerospace Forces remain a ‘force in being’ and a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces, although they currently lack the capabilities to penetrate Ukrainian air defences.

Following the destruction of Russian command and control infrastructure in July 2022, the Russian military withdrew major headquarters out of range of GMLRS and placed them in hardened structures. They also wired them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward. Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink, significantly reducing their signature. At the same time, from the battalion down, Russian forces largely rely on unencrypted analogue military radios, reflecting a shortage of trained signallers at the tactical level.

An overview of Russian adaptation reveals a force that is able to improve and evolve its employment of key systems. There is evidence of a centralised process for identifying shortcomings in employment and the development of mitigations. Nevertheless, much of this adaptation is reactive and is aimed at making up for serious deficiencies in Russian units. The result is a structure that becomes better over time at managing the problems it immediately faces, but also one that struggles to anticipate new threats. The conclusion therefore is that the Russian Armed Forces pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainian military on the defence. Nevertheless, if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination. Changes in the air combat environment, for example, have led rapidly to incidents of Russian fratricide.

[Liskomies]

Erinäisiä raportteja viime päivien ajalta, sekä Venäläisistä kuin Ukrainalaisista lähteistä, että Storm Shadowit olisi iskeneet nimenomaan paikkoihin joissa Venäjän sotilaat ovat bunkanneet ja kuolleita olisi eri lähteiden mukaan monta sataa kun iskujen arviot kuolleista ynnätään yhteen.

[hellästi takaluukkuun pantu koira]

linkin takana on pitkä pdf josta poimintoja:

Russia’s disposable infantry should be considered fundamentally different and are drawn from three principal sources: conscripts from the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (heavily attrited from early rounds of fighting); prisoners drafted by the Wagner Group; and under-trained mobilised Russian civilians. These troops were originally formed into companies of approximately 60 people, but have since been broken down into platoons of approximately 15. They are issued with small arms. Ukrainian troops report that they often appear to be under the influence of amphetamines or other narcotic substances, with material recovered from the battlefield indicating that these are commonly taken in liquid form.

It is typical for there to be between 25 and 50 UAVs from both sides operating over the contested area between the forward line of own troops and forward line of enemy troops at any given time for each 10 km of frontage.

Another area in which the Russians have demonstrated persistent competence is in the emplacement of bridges. Engineering units usually emplace them rapidly and there is no evidence that the Russian Ground Forces lack for pontoon bridges, even if their river crossing operations have exhibited serious shortcomings overall. Russian forces are sufficiently confident that they can rapidly deploy bridging that they have at times destroyed bridges, even on routes that they intend to utilise, because they assess that the disruption to Ukrainian forces is greater than the burden of having to erect pontoons across the gap.

Russian explosive reactive armour, however, has proven highly effective, preventing most anti-tank systems from defeating the tank’s armour. Some operators have reported hitting tanks multiple times with barrel-launched ATGMs without knocking them out. Significantly, Ukrainian tankers report that mobility kills against the vehicle’s tracks are also an effective means of removing Russian armour from the field because they usually cause the crew to abandon the vehicle.

According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the longest-range recorded kill by a Russian R-37 [Su-35:sta laukaistava ohjus] was at 177 km.
The longest-known shoot-down against Ukrainian aircraft was at 150 km when the aircraft was flying lower than 50 feet.

[333 tuhatta miljoonaa dollaria]

Erinäisiä raportteja viime päivien ajalta, sekä Venäläisistä kuin Ukrainalaisista lähteistä, että Storm Shadowit olisi iskeneet nimenomaan paikkoihin joissa Venäjän sotilaat ovat bunkanneet ja kuolleita olisi eri lähteiden mukaan monta sataa kun iskujen arviot kuolleista ynnätään yhteen.

Onko nä nyt sitten niitä sektoreita joilta ei tippunut tietoa ammusvarikkojen jne. sijainneista?

[hellästi takaluukkuun pantu koira]

Erinäisiä raportteja viime päivien ajalta, sekä Venäläisistä kuin Ukrainalaisista lähteistä, että Storm Shadowit olisi iskeneet nimenomaan paikkoihin joissa Venäjän sotilaat ovat bunkanneet ja kuolleita olisi eri lähteiden mukaan monta sataa kun iskujen arviot kuolleista ynnätään yhteen.

Onko nä nyt sitten niitä sektoreita joilta ei tippunut tietoa ammusvarikkojen jne. sijainneista?

nehän oli suojassa vaan himarsilta

[333 tuhatta miljoonaa dollaria]

Erinäisiä raportteja viime päivien ajalta, sekä Venäläisistä kuin Ukrainalaisista lähteistä, että Storm Shadowit olisi iskeneet nimenomaan paikkoihin joissa Venäjän sotilaat ovat bunkanneet ja kuolleita olisi eri lähteiden mukaan monta sataa kun iskujen arviot kuolleista ynnätään yhteen.

Onko nä nyt sitten niitä sektoreita joilta ei tippunut tietoa ammusvarikkojen jne. sijainneista?

nehän oli suojassa vaan himarsilta

Niinpä oli

Tai siis eikö Capt. HiMARS tosiaan luvannut ja vannonut että niille alueille ei parakkeihin putoa ohjukset joista tulee tietoa ammusten ja kaluston sijainnista.

[kohta alkavat aikamoiset setit]

Venäjä on polttanut sen verran kalustoa ettei varmaan ole riittämiin koneita mihin iskeä.

[Lusku]

Moskovassa nähty droneja, muutama osunut, suurin osa ammuttu alas

[Mäd Bästärd]

Kokki kuittasi Girkinin juttuihin että ei riitä sotilaat vallankaappaukseen ja onhan heillä myös hyvät välitkin Putiniin.

Lähde: hs sanoinettä isw sanoi että prigo sanoi

[Lusku]

Rublyovka on tiettävästi Moskovan West End

[Balam-Acab]

Rublyovka on tiettävästi Moskovan West End

toi ruplaan viittaava nimityshän ei suinkaan ole alueen virallinen nimi

[Lusku]

Rublyovka on tiettävästi Moskovan West End

toi ruplaan viittaava nimityshän ei suinkaan ole alueen virallinen nimi

Kiitos täsmennyksestä. Itseni tietopohja tässäkin perustuu aivan pintapuoliseen twitter triviaan

[38911 BASIC BYTES FREE]

Jahas, ja Oryxin listalla 2000 rikki Venäjän menettämien tankkien määrässä.

[Liskomies]

Zelensky sanoi eilen, että “We have approved the dates for the start of the movement of our troops, the decisions have been made, I thank the brigades that prepared for this.”

Psykologista veivausta vai luottavaista tykittelyä, mutta kohta varmaan mennään. Ylihuomenna ilmeisesti saapuu ekat Leopard 1:t Ukrainaan ja mahdollisesti myös Archerit jotka ehtii ainakin "kakkosaaltoon" mukaan.